The Hines Raid
Invasion of the state, June, 1863

Some time in May, 1863, a company of Kentucky cavalry, under Captain Thomas H, Hines, belonging to General John H. Morgan's division, was
sent from the rebel army in Tennessee to Kentucky, to take charge of a camp for recruiting disabled horses, with permission "to operate against the enemy north of the Cumberland river." Improving on the probable scope of this authority, Captain Hines, after "operating" a short time in the line of 
his "convalescent horse" duties, and against the Union men of Kentucky, on the 17th of June, with the assistance of some wood-boats obtained of 
his friends, crossed into Indiana, eighteen miles above Cannelton, with sixty-two men, his particular object being to pick up as many fresh horses as might conveniently be found. After making arrangements with his ferrymen to meet him in about three days, at a convenient point, he pressed into the interior, in the direction of Paoli, Orange county, taking the precaution toprotect his Hanks, as completely as the limited extent of his force would
allow, by scouts judiciously thrown out. Under the assumed character that he and his gang belonged to the Union army, and were acting under
proper orders from General Boyle, commanding the District of Kentucky, in search of deserters, he at first found but little difficulty in securing a 
number of excellent horses, leaving his own jaded and broken-down animals in their stead, and coolly and "in due form" giving vouchers upon the Federal Quartermaster at Indianapolis for the difference in value, which he accommodatingly fixed at a satisfactory and liberal rate. But his impudent disguise was soon suspected, and before his arrival on the second day of the raid at Valeen, Orange county, the whole secret of his mission became known, and the alarm, with many exaggerations as to the strength of his force and the damage he had done, spread with astonishing rapidity 
throughout the counties of Perry, Orange, Crawford, Washington and Harrison and the adjacent country.

 It is unofficially reported that at Valeen the rebels demanded cooked rations of the citizens, and, not being supplied to their satisfaction, they attempted to fire the place, with partial success. Before they reached Paoli, preparations had been made to receive them, learning which they made a sudden detour to the west, and passed round the place, taking horses as they went, to a point about seven miles northeast, where they encountered a force of fifteen armed citizens, whom they captured and plundered. Two more citizens arriving a few moments after, they were ordered to surrender, and, upon refusing, one was knocked off his horse and disabled, and the other shot and mortally wounded while trying to escape. His name was James Lisk. At this point they succeeded in procuring a guide, Mr. Bryant Breeden, whom they supposed to be "reliable," and pressed on in their march, though very late at night, to Hardinsburg, Washington county, where they arrived about day-light.

 While these events were transpiring, the men of the Legion and such of the citizens as could immediately be armed, made rapid preparations for pursuit. Sixty armed minute-men from Paoli, joined by a number from Valeen and the neighboring settlements, and a mounted battalion of the Legion from Leavenworth, under Majors Horatio Woodbury and Robert E. Clendenin, moved promptly on the rebel trail.Colonel Charles Fournier, of Perry county, commanding the Fifth Regiment of the Legion, took active measures to defend the line of the river in the rebel rear. As soon as he was informed of their entrance into the State, he called out as many mounted men as possible, and started for Flint Island Bar, to protect the Government ram "Monarch," then lying at that point entirely exposed, and the destruction of which was supposed to be the object of the raid. He arrived at ten o'clock at night, and finding that Hines had gone northward, and that there was no probable danger of interference with the ram, Captain ESSAKY, commanding the second battalion of the Fifth Regiment of the Legion, was dispatched with a sufficient force to intercept the enemy at Blue River Island, it having been reported that he would attempt to re-cross the river at that point. Colonel Fournier, as a precaution, so placed the remainder of his command as to certainly protect the ram, should a detachment of the rebels be sent to destroy her.

 (File note: USS Monarch was a United States Army sidewheel ram that saw service in the American Civil War. She operated on the Mississippi River and {{Yazoo River]] during 1862 and 1863. Monarch was built as a sidewheel towboat at Fulton, Ohio, in 1853. She sank in the Ohio River at Louisville, Kentucky, on 5 March 1861, but was refloated and repaired.^[1] The United States Army purchased her at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in April 1862 for service in support of Union Army operations and converted her into a ram in 1862 for service in conjunction with the Western Flotilla on the Mississippi River as part of the Army′s United States Ram Fleet under Lieutenant Colonel Charles Ellet, Jr.. She was commissioned at Pittsburgh with Captain R. W. Sanford in command.) Source: Wikipedia

 There were thus two forces closing in upon the marauder—the one under Majors Woodbury and Clendenin, pushing him back to the river, and the other under Captain Essary, moving in between him and the expected outlet. The former followed the rebel track through Hardinsburg to near Fredericksburg, in the southwestern part of Washington county, where, learning that the enemy was hastening toward the Ohio, they pressed forward with all possible speed. . Arriving within a short distance of Leavenworth, the force was divided, Major Woodbury taking the upper road leading toward Corydon, and Major Clendenin taking the road along the river, so as to reach the anticipated rebel crossing in time to head them off, while the other force, closing in above, would lock them in, and thus compel a fight or surrender.

 The combined movement was pressed with vigor. Captain Essary  promptly reached his destination, and the other portion of our force soon chased the enemy to the expected crossing-place, to which he had been compelled to fly nearly a day sooner than he had counted upon; consequently, when he reached the Ohio, at two o'clock P. M., on the 19th, there were no boats ready for his use; a sufficient force to badly whip him was posted in his front and rear, and it was useless to think of getting any relief, under such circumstances, from boats—even should an attempt be made to send them. In his dilemma, the rebel commander maneuvered to avoid a collision with the militia and citizens, and turned to his guide to help him to another crossing-place. The guide, being a true Union man, unwillingly impressed into the enemy's service, determined to make the most of his position, and the delay which he bewilderingly(?) caused in finding what he reported to be a practicable ford, enabled the river guard on duty at and near Leavenworth, below, to arm the steamer "Izetta," and start her up stream to aid the land forces in preventing the rebel exodus. In due time, Hines was easily lured by his guide to the Blue River Island, about three miles above Leavenworth, where the channel on the Indiana side is shallow and easily fordable in low water, (as it was at the time,) with deep and swift water between the inland and the southern shore. Major Clendenin's command, including Captain Essary's company, soon came up, and the rebels, thinking their only safety was in crossing the "ford" which lay before them, plunged in with triumphant yells, bearing their booty with them, and soon reached the island. Here, while huddled together, viewing the rather unfavorable prospect beyond, Major Clendenin opened fire, and they ineffectually discharged some shots in return, and then, as a last resort, attempted to swim to the Kentucky bank ; but the "Izetta," at this opportune moment, opened upon them with a piece of artillery and some small arms, and forced them back—Captain Hines and two men only escaping. Three men were killed, three wounded, and two drowned, according to one report; according to another, four men were killed outright, and four more wounded and drowned. One Captain, one Lieutenant (an Adjutant), and fifty men surrendered as prisoners of war, and were sent to Louisville upon the order of General Boyle. Five horses were lost in the attempt to cross the river, but the remainder were captured, and those which were stolen from our citizens were returned, while the arms and other property were duly turned over to the Government authorities. Considerable property was stolen by the rebels at Valeen, Hardinsburg, King's Mills, and at farm-houses along their route, but the amount in value has not been reported.

 As Major Clendenin was receiving the prisoners and taking an account of the captured property, Major Woodbury, with his mounted force, appeared. They were much disappointed in not arriving in time to participate in the capture, to which their energetic pursuit had largely contributed. The honor of the affair may be fairly divided between Major Clendenin, Major Woodbury and the Legion of Crawford, Perry and Harrison counties John R., formerly Adjutant of the Fiftieth Indiana Volunteers, also took part in the capture, organizing and commanding several squads of minute-men hastily banded together from the counties of Washington, Orange, Crawford and Harrison. Mr. Bryant Breeden deserves especial credit for his tact in misguiding the rebels. Private Findley McNaughton, of the First Indiana Cavalry, who was "gobbled up" as a prisoner, managed, while in the custody of the rebels, to send one of Mr. Breeden's little boys, who was following his father "to see the fun," to Leavenworth, with information of the intent of the rebels to recross the Ohio above that point, thus enabling the citizens to patrol the channel with the steamer and check their retreat, as has been already stated.

 Captain Hines, single-handed and alone, a few days afterward, joined Morgan at Brandenburg, and took part in the celebrated raid through Indiana and Ohio in July, 1863. He was a dashing and daring officer; was captured with his chief and with him made his escape from the Ohio penitentiary, and clung to his bold riders with a zeal worthy of a better cause until the final collapse of the rebellion.

The Raid Of Morgan.
INVASION OF THE STATE-JULY 1863.
The invasion of Indiana in the summer of 1863 by a division of rebel troops, under command of General John H. Morgan, when considered in the light of events then pending, must always be regarded as a prominent feature in our history. No hostile military movement of any consequence, except that resulting in the battle of Tippecanoe, had ever before been made in our territory. The invasion, or " raid," as it was called, was intended, as will be hereafter shown, to distract and disarrange the plans and movements of the federal forces then threatening the rebel army of the West with annihilation, but in its results proved to be only a wild and reckless adventure, failing almost entirely of its object, and ending in sad discomfiture to the rebel cause. Its projectors sought to make it the means of escape from a trap in which the superior generalship and overwhelming strength of Rosecrans and his co-operators had involved them ; it was a desperate make-shift, a kind of " forlorn hope" maneuver, to extricate the army of Bragg from apparent destruction. While the "raid" was a failure and mistake, it occasioned our people much inconvenience, and created an intense excitement; and the plundering, burnings and damages, which fell upon our citizens living within its track, were by no means inconsiderable. It is proper, therefore, as a matter of local history, connected with the rebellion, that an account of it should be given in this report.

 The circumstances which gave rise to the raid may be briefly stated: First—the necessities, in a military sense, of the rebel army in the West; and, second—the condition of feeling on the part of a considerable portion of the people of this and adjoining States, which seemed to promise encouragement to so desperate an enterprise. As to the necessities of the rebels, we have a full, and perhaps fair, account in General Bazil Duke's  " History of Morgan's Cavalry." Duke was Morgan's factotum—first serving as his Lieutenant; and afterwards, when the great marauder was made a Brigadier, he was promoted to succeed him as Colonel of the original regiment of "Morgan's Cavalry." He was his confidential adviser and friend, and was with him in all his campaigns, except one.

 Duke had, therefore, every opportunity of informing himself of Morgan's plans and movements, and his admitted ability and sprightliness guarantee his statements as worthy of consideration in the preparation of this narrative. General Duke substantially says, that just before the raid was undertaken, the position of the rebel army in Tennessee, under Bragg and Buckner, was perilous; that Rosecrans was strong enough to press Bragg hard at Tullahoma—Buckner, in East Tennessee, being too weak to help him, or even to protect himself against the imminent attack of Burnside—while, in addition, there was a large National force scattered along a convenient line to the east, under General Judah, which could keep open communications for Rosecrans, and resist rebel raids in that quarter so long as the hostile armies remained in their positions, or could be concentrated, when an advance was ordered, and thus make the force on Bragg still more formidable. The problem, as viewed by the rebels—who well understood the important fact that General Judah, in Burnside's department, as Duke states, was in command of " about 5000 excellent cavalry "—was to avert the immediate danger of a blow upon Bragg's flank from this cavalry force. General Morgan advised a raid through Indiana and Ohio, with the double object of preventing Burnside from moving on Buckner, in East Tennessee, and preventing Judah's cavalry from making a junction with Rosecrans. His experience in raiding through Kentucky enabled him to argue, with plausibility, that a new raid upon that State, alone, would be disastrous and crushed out so quickly that its effects would not justify the risks and dangers of the venture ; while, he contended, a grand foray through Indiana and Ohio would keep a large force of Union troops employed upon its track for weeks. Bragg, as he was apt to do, took a " conservative view " of the situation, and would only allow Morgan to make a raid through Kentucky, expressly stipulating in his order that it should not extend beyond the Ohio River.

 The Morgan Raid was, therefore, made in disobedience of orders; so Duke positively states. This fact is only important as showing Morgan's disposition to have his own way, and, as he generally did, to conduct his campaigns in a peculiarly independent manner, which, by the way, was the great secret of his fame, and the magnet which attracted to his standard so many bright and adventurous young Kentuckians, of whom his command was principally composed. General Bragg knew the peril of Morgan's proposed movement, and evidently feared the effect the isolation, and perhaps loss, of so important and valuable a force of cavalry would have upon his army ; but he probably did not appreciate the advantages of its brilliant success, should it be successful, to the same extent that Morgan hoped.

 The "vim" and "dash" of Morgan impelled him to over-ride the orders of his superior, and like a reckless and desperate bravado as he was, he determined to meet and if possible overcome the dangers which encompassed the rebel army in the West by a tour de force that would carry consternation and dismay to the hitherto peaceful regions north of the Ohio. It is unnecessary here to enter upon details as to the condition of 
feeling entertained by many persons in the North on the subject of the war, the sympathy exhibited in behalf of the rebel cause, not only in legitimate opposition to the policy and measures of the Federal Government, but in the commission of illegal acts; the organization of treasonable societies and movements, and the declaration of treasonable sentiments by speeches, newspaper articles, and resolutions; and the effect all these sympathetic evidences may have had in determining Morgan's extraordinary, bold, and unauthorized course; but the candid historian, in after days, may find in the facts themselves ample material for investigation as to the inducements which detached, at such a perilous crisis, so important a command from Bragg's army. Bragg's situation undoubtedly required a raid, or some similar distracting movement, but if the diversity of sentiment and treasonable evidences, to which allusion has been made, had not reached Morgan's ears, does it seem probable that the "territory North of the Ohio" would have been deemed good ground upon which to make such a hazardous experiment? His orders were not to come here. Would he have disobeyed his orders and jeopardized the safety of his army, in which he and the whole "Confederacy" felt so much pride, if he had not thought that these friendly indications were founded upon a reality that would "crop out" in substantial form upon his appearance in a country where rebel plundering and the marauder's torch had not before been known? He was ordered to make a raid through Kentucky, and the temptation to go beyond, for the purpose of recruiting his "mount," and procuring supplies, which his command so much needed, was very great; but is it likely that even these inducements would have caused him to extend his inarch beyond the prescribed bounds, if treasonable indications of sympathy and assistance had not been shown by means of the press and by other channels through which they sought expression and became known to the rebels in the South?

Morgan's division of rebel cavalry,—consisting, according to General Duke, of two brigades, the first numbering 1,460 men, the second 1,000 men, in all 2,460, with four pieces of artillery,—started from Alexandria, Tennessee, on the ll^th of June, 1863, on the hazardous expedition which was to end in the death or capture of nearly every man connected with it. Its march through the northern edge of Tennessee and through Kentucky, it does not comport with the purpose of this report to relate in any length. It had several pretty hard skirmishes on the way, particularly at the crossing of Green River on the 4^th of July, in which it was badly beaten ; and on the 5^th at Lebanon, where it was successful, but with considerable loss, including General Morgan's youngest brother, Thomas, First Lieutenant, Second Kentucky, who was killed at the last moment of the engagement. The 4^th of July, 1863, was remarkably unfortunate for rebels everywhere. Morgan found it no more auspicious than did Pemberton, or Lee, or any other of the dozen commanders who fought, on that day, not only against the arms and gallantry of the national troops, but against every sentiment and memory that stirs the blood of the true American!

 On the 6^th, at dark, about thirty miles from Louisville, a train on the Louisville and Nashville railroad was captured, and by "tapping" the telegraph wire it was ascertained by Morgan that he was expected at Louisville. " Tapping the telegraph" was a frequent and sometimes very important operation for Morgan, as he thereby learned the position of our forces and either avoided them, or prepared to attack them, as he deemed best. 
On the morning of the 7^th, after crossing Salt River, Captains Taylor and Merriwether, of the Tenth Kentucky, were sent forward with a detachment to the Ohio River to capture steamers to carry the division over to this State. At the same time, Captain Davis, with two companies, was dispatched to cross the Ohio at Twelve-Mile Island, to give employment to the militia of lower Indiana, and leave the main body free from attack from that quarter, with orders to rejoin the division at Salem. The result of thislast enterprise is thus stated by General Duke : "Captain Davis crossed into Indiana with the two companies assigned him, but failed to rejoin the division, and was surrounded by overwhelming numbers, and himself and the greater part of his command captured." This detachment was thus permanently lost to the expedition, as well as three other companies left at various points in Kentucky, leaving the effective force for the invasion, according to Duke, about 2,200 men.

 After sending out these detachments, the division proceeded to Garnettsville, where it remained till midnight, then advanced to Brandenburg, where it arrived about nine o'clock on the morning of the 8^th. At Brandenburg it was joined by Captain Hines, who
had been " raiding" in a small way a short time before in Crawford, Orange and Harrison counties in this State, but so unprofitably that he left pretty nearly all his command behind him in the hands of our militia.  

Brandenburg is a small town situated on a high bluff about fifty miles below Louisville, on the Kentucky shore, and two miles above Mauckport, a small Indiana town. The two officers charged with the duty of providing ferriage for the division, arrived shortly after leaving the main column, and directly captured the steamer " J. T. McCoombs," in the Louisville and Henderson trade. She ran up to the wharf about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the 7^th, and the moment she touched, a rebel squad boarded her and took possession. As if fortune were resolved to favor them to the utmost, a second steamer, the " Alice Dean," came in sight 'round the bend below, a short time after, and they prepared to capture her also. As her course made it apparent that she did not intend to land, they ran the " McCoombs " out to her, signaling her to stop. When the two boats touched, a party boarded the "Dean" and secured her, and thus ample means of ferriage were obtained in a very few hours, and all were ready for the arrival of the main column.

 Information of these proceedings having reached Lieutenant Colonel William J. Irvin, at Mauckport, he dispatched messengers to Colonel Lewis Jordan, at Corydon, requesting troops to assist in preventing the rebels from crossing. The steamer " Lady Pike" coming up the river, about the same time, was stopped and sent back to Leavenworth for a piece of artillery and its gunners, of the Indiana Legion, then stationed at that point. The boat returned at midnight with a six pounder and thirty men under command of Captain G. W. Lyon, of the Crawford county Artillery. To avoid the observation of the rebels at Brandenburg, the boat landed two miles below Mauckport, and the gun was hauled by hand to that place, where Colonel John Timberlake, with one hundred of the Harrison county Legion, took command and proceeded with the united forces to a point opposite Brandenburg. He crossed Buck creek by means of an old boat, and his men dragged the gun through the fields and placed it in position at 7 o'clock on the morning of the 8^th in front of an old house opposite the landing. For an hour or two the Kentucky bank was concealed by a dense fog. Morgan arrived before it lifted, and at once began his preparations for crossing. As soon as the fog allowed the opposite bank to be seen, Captain Lyon trained his gun on the "McCoombs" and sent a shot through her, frightening off the rebels, who had just commenced embarking, and wounding one of their brigade quartermasters. Several shots were fired after those who were in retreat from the boats, and some were seen to fall as they hurried up the road out of range. Then, being informed that the rebel force was very small, less than 200 men, and hoping to save the steamers, Captain Lyon changed the direction of his fire to the groups of cavalry on the bank, driving them out of sight to the rear of the town. Supposing that the rebels had been, by this demonstration, induced to abandon their project of invasion, Colonel Timberlake ordered the " McCoombs" to cross to the Indiana side and take his command over to Brandenburg, but the order was of' course unheeded. In a few minutes some pieces of artillery was put into position by the rebels on Brandenburg heights and opened an accurate and fatal fire on Lyon's gun, Lieutenant James H. Current, of the Mauckport. Rifles, and citizen George Nance, of Harrison county, being killed while working it. Our artillery-men having no covering but the old house, which the rebel guns made untenable, fell back about half a mile out of range, hauling their gun with them. At the same time a portion of the rebel force opened a fusillade upon the remainder of our men who were posted along the bank to resist the passage of the boats, and the fire was sharply returned. Soon, however, the rebel artillery was brought into play, which compelled the little Union force to fall back. The Second Kentucky and Ninth Tennessee Regiments of the rebels were immediately sent across the river, leaving their horses behind them. Colonel Timberlake, with a small force, rallied to the gun and fired several unavailing shots at the boat while it was crossing.

 As soon as a landing was effected, the rebels formed under the bank and advanced, capturing the gun and several prisoners. Colonel Timberlake seeing he was greatly overmatched, fell back in good order toward Corydon. Major Jacob S. Pfrimmer, of the Sixth Regiment of the Legion, in command of a small body of mounted men, kept up a brisk skirmish with the rebel advance guard, on the different, roads leading to Corydon, till late in the evening, when our retreating force reached the line of battle formed by two hundred men, under Colonel Jordan, six miles from Corydon, on the Mauckport road. A small squad of the " Mounted Hoosiers," belonging to the Sixth Legion, under Captain William Forquor, acting as scouts, came into collision with the enemy while they were advancing, but sustained no injury, except, the Captain, whose horse under the fire dashed him against a tree, but without disabling him. The scouts skirmished and were on the alert during the night, the rebels having halted near our line, and both parties throwing out pickets.

 While this retreat and pursuit were in progress, an interesting state of affairs for Morgan had been created by a little gunboat. General Duke relates that directly after the return of the two steamers from their first trip to the Indiana side, a small boat, "tightly boarded up with tiers of heavy oak planking," ran rapidly down the river and opened fire, first on Brandenburg, and then on the rebel force pressing after the Legion. Two of Morgan's guns in battery on the Heights replied, and for an hour a duel was maintained between the boat and the battery, with no particular injury to either, but to the fearful discomfiture of the rebel General and the peril of his enterprise. He could not put a steamer across while the gunboat kept in easy range; a single shot might send the whole to the bottom ; consequently he could neither join the two regiments already landed, nor get them back, and he could not tell what force or fate they might meet when fairly out upon Indiana soil. He was cut in two, and the gunboat kept the fragments apart. She held his expedition completely at the command of her guns; but, unaccountably, after an hour's firing, she ran back up the river, and Morgan at once began sending his force across in the utmost haste. 

About five o'clock P. M., the same gun-boat came back with two transports, (ordinary steamers,) with a battalion of the Seventy-First Indiana, under Colonel Biddle, and a section of the Twenty-Third Indiana Battery, under Lieutenant Ross,. The gun-boat was in advance, under an officer of the Western Flotilla, who commanded the expedition. Morgan stopped crossing, and held his boats around a bend of the river out of range, his battery on the Heights firing with rapidity, but without damage, at the little fleet. The officer in command of the gun-boat claimed that his craft was only bullet-proof, and that Morgan's guns would sink him, and therefore withdrew and proceeded up the river. The two transports remained for some time, and kept up the artillery engagement with the battery on shore until one of Lieutenant Ross' guns became disabled by the breaking of the boat's deck from the recoil, when it being plainly seen that the rebels had decidedly the advantage, the transports also withdrew.

  The remainder of Morgan's division at once crossed, and advanced and encamped a few miles from the river. They plundered freely. Their historian says they "found the larders unlocked, fires on the hearths, bread half made up, and the chickens parading about the doors with a confidence that was touching, but misplaced." In other words, the rebels helped themselves to whatever they wanted and could find in the houses of the poor people they had scared into the woods. They burned the mill of Mr. Peter Lopp, on Buck creek, three miles from the river, their first exploit in that line in the State. Four miles south of Corydon one of their soldiers was shot near the house of Rev. Peter Glenn, whom they induced by a flag of truce to come out unarmed to meet them, when they killed him and burned his house and out-buildings.

 PREPARATIONS FOR RESISTANCE.
The first information of Morgan's movements which indicated the probability of his approach to our border, was conveyed to Brigadier General O. B. Willcox, commanding the District of Indiana and Michigan, by Major General Burnside, who had received it from Brigadier General J. T. Boyle, commanding the District of Kentucky, on the 4th of July, the same day that Morgan was defeated at Green River bridge. General Boyle stated that a cavalry force, supposed to be about 4,000 strong, with artillery, commanded by John H. Morgan, had crossed the Cumberland river, and was advancing upon the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. He also stated that he had no available United States troops in Kentucky, and earnestly requested the assistance of an adequate force to check the invasion. General Burnside ordered the Seventy-First Indiana, and any available cavalry and artillery in the State, to be sent at once to Kentucky. General Willcox promptly dispatched the Seventy-First Indiana Regiment, two companies of the Third Indiana Cavalry, and Myers' Twenty-Third Indiana Battery to Louisville, where they reported to General Boyle on the following morning. This movement left Indianapolis, of United States troops, only two companies of the Sixty-Third Indiana, doing guard duty at the Soldiers' Home, some hundreds of recently exchanged prisoners of the Fifty-First and Seventy-Third Indiana, and a small number of recruits.

 This stripping the State of National troops, though necessitated by the aspect of affairs in Kentucky at the time, was unfortunate, and the more so because our home defenses were in a far less efficient condition than they should have been. Governor Morton, to whom an invasion of our Southern border was an ever present peril, had used every means in his power to provide adequate defenses, but with far less than satisfactory success. The Legion, though generally organized with more or less completeness through out the border counties, was too often a mere skeleton, or loose aggregation of citizens, with little military discipline or knowledge. And where better organized and more sedulously drilled, it was too feeble in numbers to present an effectual resistance to veteran enemies. A sufficiency of arms had not been supplied, and as late as the 29th of June, the Governor had telegraphed to the Secretary of War for 25,000 stand of arms and 12 pieces of artillery for State use. But the most serious deficiency was in mounted troops, of which we had not more than two hundred, besides a few squads of armed citizens using their own horses, who were called out by the emergency. Against veteran cavalry, recruiting, as horses became exhausted, by stealing in all directions, raw levies of infantry could not, even with the greatest facilities for transportation, be made very effective. General Willcox, General Wallace and General Downey, all speak particularly of this deficiency and its unfortunate consequences. "With one-tenth of the forces we had in arms during the raid, well mounted, Morgan never could have escaped from the State."

 On the reception of information that Morgan was marching northward through Kentucky, Governor Morton telegraphed Colonel E. A. Maginniss, at New Albany, to order out all the forces at his command, and send a messenger to Colonel Jordan, of Harrison county, with instructions that he should also order out his command immediately; also to put Kn Knapp's battery, the German artillery of Floyd county, on a steamer and send it to the mouth of Salt River to prevent guerrillas from crossing the Ohio. He also notified General Boyle of his purpose to cooperate heartily in any movement to resist Morgan, and asked information as to the rebel force and its whereabouts. General Boyle's reply the next day was that he did not know where Morgan was, but that he had captured the Twentieth Kentucky at Lebanon. Before night General Boyle's want of information was rather alarmingly supplied, as he telegraphed to Governor Morton that the companies of our Legion in Clarke county, if there were any, should be sent to him at Louisville, as Morgan was then between Lebanon and Louisville. The next day, the 6th of July, he again telegraphed the Governor that he had learned nothing further of Morgan's movements, except that the telegraph operator at the Junction reported cannonading as having been heard in the direction of Bardstown.But the General did not believe that Morgan would come to Louisville, and he did believe that the forces of Generals Hobson and Shackelford, then in pursuit, would overtake and beat him.

 Governor Morton, as little influenced by General Boyle's sudden confidence as by his premature alarm, ordered the Legion to retain their organization and arms, and be in readiness for prompt service. Part of the force called out, at the request of General Willcox, was ordered to Louisville, and Colonel Deland's First Michigan Sharp shooters and the Twelfth Michigan Battery were ordered from Michigan to this State. On the morning of the 8th of July unofficial information was received that the apprehensions which had impelled these precautionary steps were realized, and that Morgan was on the bank of the Ohio preparing to cross. Burnside, at Cincinnati, was immediately informed of the movement, and a request to the Chief of Ordinance at Washington for a number of batteries of smooth bored six-pounder and twelve-pounder howitzers was promptly answered that the guns were on the way from St. Louis. To General Boyle, whose solicitations had deprived us of all our available Government troops, an earnest request was sent that he should dispatch a force to the threatened points to prevent the rebels from crossing, or to drive them out if they had crossed. " You have all our regular troops," said Governor Morton ; "please state what steps have been taken to arrest the progress of the rebels." General Boyle made no reply. In the evening of the same day news was received that the rebels had crossed. The next day, the 9th, a second dispatch was sent to General Boyle asking information of Morgan's movements. No reply was made. To a third dispatch, he answered from New Albany that " Morgan is near Corydon, and will move either upon New Albany or into the interior of the State. He has no less than 4,000 men and six pieces of artillery. General Hobson in pursuit of him is at Brandenburg, and has sent for transports to cross his forces. Your cities and towns will be sacked and pillaged if you do not bring out your State forces." This was the first official information Governor Morton had received in regard to the invasion. The sagacity that warned us to bring out our State forces if we would save our towns from pillage, could only be paralleled by the generosity that accompanied the warning with no offer to assist us even with our own troops!

 Before the receipt of General Boyle's belated news, General Willcox, cooperating with Governor Morton, had made such preparations as he could to meet the rebels. He ordered all the railroad cars and locomotives to be secured for the transportation of the militia, their arms and supplies; the Government Quartermaster. Commissary and Ordnance Officers were directed to furnish everything that might be required for properly equipping and supplying the troops, and the Superintendent of the State Arsenal at once put a large force at work in preparing ammunition, of which there was not a sufficient supply. The receipt of the first official information of the invasion was immediately made the occasion for the publication of a General Order, dated at the Executive Department, July 9th, announcing the presence of a considerable rebel force in the State, and ordering that all able-bodied white male citizens in the several counties south of the National Road should forthwith form themselves into companies of at least sixty persons, elect officers, and arm them selves with such arms as they could procure. The companies thus formed were required to .perfect themselves in military drill as rapidly as possible, and hold themselves subject to further orders from the Executive. They were requested to be mounted, in all cases, if possible. Citizens in other parts of the State were earnestly requested to form military companies, and be ready for service when called for. Prompt reports by telegraph of the formation of companies were desired. Officers of the Indiana Legion were charged with the execution of the order, and the United States officers were requested to render such assistance as they were able.

 The People Called Out
At the same time a dispatch was sent to Captain Pennock, commanding the river fleet at Cairo, informing him of the invasion, and requesting the assistance of all his available, gun-boats to prevent the rebels from re-crossing the Ohio. The Captain replied that there were six gun-boats up the river, and he would at once send. more. A request was telegraphed to General Burnside to send back the troops and artillery sent to Kentucky a few days before ; and it was suggested to him by the Governor that Morgan would probably attempt to get back into Kentucky at some point between Madison and Louisville. He therefore urged the propriety of placing a lot of spare artillery, collected at Louisville, upon boats and patrolling the river between Louisville and Lawrenceburg. 

General Burnside promptly replied that he had directed passenger boats not to run between Cincinnati and Louisville without guards, and had requested that a proper disposition be made of the gun-boats, both above and below Louisville, to prevent the enemy from re-crossing. He ordered General Boyle to patrol the river, as suggested by the Governor, and assured the latter of sufficient National troops to repel any attack, and of his desire to do whatever he could to protect the State in the emergency. In order to apply the Governor's suggestion of arming ordinary steamers as river patrols, General Willcox at once sent Lieutenant-Commander Geo. Brown, of the Navy, then in Indianapolis on leave, to the Ohio to organize and command a number of these extemporary gun-boats, which he proceeded to do in a thorough and satisfactory manner. The idea proved to be a good one, and Morgan's escape across the river at one of the many fords between Louisville and Cincinnati was probably prevented, and his final capture assured, by this means. 

 Having no arms suitable for cavalry, the Governor purchased of Messrs. B. Kittridge & Co., Cincinnati, eight hundred Wesson carbines; and arrangements were made whereby 17,000 muskets, 25,000 sets of accoutrements and 2 batteries of artillery were procured from the St. Louis Arsenal in time to be issued to the rapidly organized militia. To give the injunctions of the general order issued on the 9th more direct and immediate effect, the Governor, on the day following, addressed a dispatch to prominent and leading citizens in all easily accessible counties in the central and northern portions of the State, requesting that all available men of their neighborhoods be brought to the capital at the earliest moment, organized by companies, with their blankets; and that runners be sent out in their counties to give information and call out all who were willing to volunteer.

 
Response Of The People
While the authorities were busy with these preparations, the people were gathering in such numbers as never could have been anticipated, not only along the track of the rebel march, but all over the State. The call of the Governor, the conflicting and exaggerated rumors that were afloat, and the anxious disposition felt in every locality to assist in catching and chastising the invaders, created the greatest excitement and enthusiasm. In less than twenty-four hours after the dispatch was sent cut soliciting individual cooperation in bringing out troops, the gentlemen addressed reported an aggregate of 5,000 men for service, and outside of their efforts 10,000 more had been gathered and were on the way to the capital. On the same day, the 10th, the Governor informed General Burnside that he would have 15,000 militia in Indianapolis on that day. Within two days 20,000 men had been actually mustered at Indianapolis, and the authorities had notice of the organization and readiness for service of 45,000 more. he gathering of 65,000 men in forty-eight hours is such a display of patriotic energy and devotion as may safely challenge a comparison with any similar exhibition in history. And the circumstances under which it was made enhance its magnitude and merit, greatly. Farmers were in the midst of harvest; they were weak-handed from the absence of scores of thousands of sons and brothers in the army, and the impossibility of replacing them with other laborers ; at the best, the ripening crops could be but indifferently secured, and to desert them to resist the rebels, for they knew not how long, was equivalent, so far as they could tell, to losing them utterly. Manufactories, mills, mechanics' shops, were equally in want of laborers, and would suffer greatly if work were suspended for even a day. Yet farmers left their grain to rot in the fields, mechanics dropped their tools, merchants abandoned their stores, professional men their desks, clerks forgot their ledgers, and students their text-books, and young and old alike all swarmed in constantly thickening throngs to the capital, or the nearest place of rendezvous, as if there were no duty or interest of that hour but the safety of the State. Indianapolis, which was the great central mustering place, was converted into a huge barrack. There were soldiers in every open lot and square, in every vacant building, in halls, in lofts, in the streets. Railway trains were rushing in every hour, crowded inside and outside with shouting masses. The country roads were cloudy with dust raised by the tread of companies hurrying from every school district and neighborhood. The labor of organizing and equipping so great a force in so short a time was immense, but the authorities were as zealous as the people, and the work was done. General Willcox and his staff officers were vigilant, energetic, sleepless. Major General Lewis Wallace, at the request of the Governor, was detailed by the War Department to assist in the defense of the State. Brigadier General Henry B. Carrington came from Ohio and gave his best efforts to the organization and mustering of the forces, a work in which his experience and energy made him unrivalled. Brigadier General Milo S. Hascall, on his way to the field, was sent back by General Burnside and ordered to report to the District Commander for any duty he might deem proper, and was assigned to the command of the defenses of Indianapolis. Captain John H. Farquhar, of the regulars, was appointed a Brigadier General of the State Militia, and ordered to Evansville to organize a brigade for the protection of the border on the lower Ohio against any counter or co-operative movement that might be made by the rebels in aid of Morgan. Major General John L. Mansfield, of the Legion, was sent to New Albany to bring out the militia on the way, and organize the temporary forces. Colonel W. W. Frybarger, of the artillery, was dispatched to the border to organize a force in that branch of the service; and the services of other officers, as will be more particularly stated hereafter, were brought into requisition and disposed to the best advantage. Offers of assistance from other States were made and accepted A company of sharp-shooters from Mattoon, Illinois, under Captain David H. Lane, splendidly armed with Henry rifles, was assigned to the One-Hundred-and-Third Regiment of Minute- Men. Two other Illinois companies, Captain Ashmore's, of Charleston, and Captain Ferris's, of Ashmore, were assigned to the One-Hundred-and-Ninth Regiment of Minute-Men. General Schofield, commanding at St. Louis, Missouri, sent the Tenth Regiment Kansas Volunteers and the Twelfth Kansas Battery, which were stationed at Mitchell to intercept rebel reinforcements.

 
Disposition of Forces
In the position of Morgan after crossing into this State any one of four movements could be attempted, either involving injuries to the loyal people and cause of enormous extent. He could move on New Albany and Jeffersonville where there was deposited about $4,000,000 worth of public stores; he could by a judicious distribution of his command burn the bridges and disable the tracks of the Ohio and Mississippi and the Jefferson railroads by which the Government was sending troops and supplies to Rosecrans; he could advance to Indianapolis, as he once avowed it his purpose to do, release the rebel prisoners, and burn the Capitol, the Arsenal and the immense military stores; or, he could push along on a plundering foray, parallel with the Ohio river, if the uprising of the people left no other movement open to him, till he had a chance to re-cross to Kentucky.

Jeffersonville and New Albany were attached to the District of Kentucky and properly belonged to General Boyle's command, but Major General James Hughes, of the Legion, organized and disposed of such forces of the Legion and Minute-Men as could be raised, for the protection of both places, and the rebels left them unharmed. As our troops were mostly raw, undisciplined infantry, it was impossible to employ them with any good result, in such strength as they presented during the first days of the raid, against veteran cavalry. General Willcox concurred with the State authorities in the plan of obstructing Morgan's march,— scouring the country felling trees in the roads, tearing up bridges, and creating obstacles wherever it was possible, to delay him till adequate forces could be collected and properly disposed. Our militia, besides that at Indianapolis, was concentrated chiefly at two points on the Ohio and Mississippi railroad—the Western Division at Mitchell, the Eastern at Seymour, and cars were collected at these points to carry them wherever they might be needed. Major General Hughes, after ascertaining that Morgan would not move against New Albany, went up to Mitchell, where he organized about 2,000 men and held them in readiness to resist an attack upon that point, or move elsewhere as circumstances might require. General John Love, acting Brigadier General under appointment and orders from General Willcox, took command at Seymour. He reports that there were two regiments of United States volunteers there, and, in addition to these, he organized about 300 Minute-Men and a small force of citizens, who, using their own horses, acted as scouts and patrols, and rendered valuable service in that capacity. Colonel Samuel B. Sering, of the Legion, had at Madison a force of about 2,000 men, with four pieces of artillery. This force was disposed, with the assistance of Colonel Bernard F. Mullen, Thirty-Fifth Indiana Volunteers, so as to guard the river, which was easily fordable at several places in the vicinity of Madison and Hanover, and the roads leading to those places. Trees were felled by the citizens under the direction of the Hon. David C. Branham, and the posi tions of the troops thus greatly strengthened. General Alexander C. Downey, of Ohio county, ordered two regiments of the Legion, that of Colonel H. T. Williams, of Ohio county, and that of Colonel J. H. Burkham, of Dearborn county, to Seymour; and Colonel Harris Keeney, of Switzerland county, with his command, was ordered to Madison. Colonel Sering had orders, if Morgan attempted to cross the Ohio at or near Madison, to destroy all the boats if necessary, and defeat the attempt if possible, and similar orders were sent to other commanders at various points on the river. Such disposition of our forces at Indianapolis had been made as to render it impossible for Morgan to advance upon that place, as he doubtless would been glad to have done, without incurring certain destruction. His flanks were menaced; reinforcements were cut off; the line of retreat across the Ohio was defended by our best rnilitia and watched by vigilant gun-boats and patrol steamers; while before him lay the enormous mass of troops concentrated at the Capital ; and behind, close upon his heels, followed General Hobson with 4,000 mounted men. A single day sufficed to show him how rapidly and fatally the strength of the State was pressing down upon him, and, abandoning all other schemes, he took to flight. It was his only resource. His raid was converted into a stupendous stampede, and his departure from the State was marked by but little of the deliberation and confidence which he exhibited when he entered it.

 Advance On Corydon And The Fight.
In our account of Morgan's movements, on the 8th of July, we left him near Corydon, in front of our little force of militia and minute-men, under Colonel Lewis Jordan, of the Sixth Legion, consisting, when concentrated, of about 400 men. Colonel Jordan was assisted by Colonel John Timberlake, Major Leonidas Stout, Captain George L. Key, and Captain James D. Irwin, as volunteer aids. On the morning of Wednesday, the 8th, as soon as Colonel Jordan was informed of the invasion, he dispatched a messenger with the information to Surgeon Thomas W. Fry, who was in command under General Boyle, of the post of New Albany, and requested reinforcements. Major Fry received the request at 12 o'clock the same day, and promptly communicated it to his superior commander at Louisville, some sixteen hours before the whole rebel force had got up in front of Colonel Jordan's lines. Three or four messages to the same effect were sent subsequently. Reinforcements of both men and artillery were promised, and there was ample time to have forwarded them before the attack on Thursday afternoon, the 9th, but for some unexplained reason none were sent, and our handful of raw men were left to make the best fight they could.

On the morning of the 9th, our scouts reported the rebel advance moving forward. Falling back slowly, and constantly skirmishing, Colonel Jordan reached a point on the Mauckport and Laconia roads, about a mile from Corydon, where he formed a line of battle, and constructed such hasty defenses as he could. At ten o'clock the rebels appeared in force along the whole line, and commenced an attack upon our left, which was held by the " Spencer Guards,'' under Captain George W. Lahue. The Guards repelled it vigorously; it was repeated twice, but with the same result, and the loss of quite a number of the assailants, killed and wounded. This determined resistance made it necessary for the enemy to reinforce that portion of their line, and the left was consequently compelled to fall back. An advance was then made upon our entire front, but our men held their ground bravely, and maintained the fight with spirit, and considerable loss to the enemy, for half an hour.

 Then the rebel reserve being brought up and a regiment thrown in on our flank and rear, cutting off reinforcements, their artillery opening upon our slender defenses at the same moment, Colonel Jordan was forced to fall back to Corydon. But here further resistance was seen to be worse than useless. The rebels planted artillery, of which we had none, on a hill south of the town and opened fire, and the little band of defenders soon found itself nearly surrounded by a force of veterans numbering eight to one, with retreat cut off. In this position, Colonel Jordan prudently surrendered his command, then consisting of 345 men, who were shortly afterwards paroled by General Morgan. Our loss was three killed—Harry Stepelton, Nathan McKinzie and William Heth ; Jacob Ferrace, one of the Commissioners of Harrison county, was mortally, and Caleb Thomas and John Glenn severely, wounded. Isaac Lang died of heat and exhaustion in the fight. The rebel loss was eight killed and thirty-three wounded. General Duke says our men "defended their rail piles resolutely," a sufficient proof that they did their duty, and an indication that if the reinforcements and artillery promised from New Albany had been sent to them, the enemy would have met so serious a resistance his march would have been delayed till the fast-gathering forces of the State could have intercepted him, or until General Hobson's pursuing force could have come up. As it was, the delay was important and the loss inflicted considerable. Upon the surrender, the rebels marched into and occupied Corydon.

 Morgan and his principal officers made their headquarters at Kintner's hotel, while his men swarmed through the town, plundering without check or discrimination. They took from Messrs. Douglass, Denbo & Co. clothing, hats, caps and boots to the amount of $3,500; Mr. Samuel J. Wright's store was laid under contribution for a large amount of goods; the drug store of Dr. Reeder was plundered, and a number of private houses were entered and robbed of whatever clothing or other desirable articles could be found. The ladies were compelled to cook meals for the robbers, if none or not enough were ready when they "called."

 The County Treasurer, Mr. Willison Hisey, was robbed of $750.00, and upon each of the three flouring mills of the town a contribution of $1,000.00 was levied, but remitted upon payment of $2,100.00, which General Morgan was considerate enough to accept from the three, as a ransom from burning. When asked "by what right he made such a demand." he pointed to his troops, then busily robbing the town, and said, "there is my authority." It was sufficient—if not satisfactory. While marching into town, they took prisoners Hon. S. K. Wolfe, State Senator, and Samuel W. Douglass, Esq., County Auditor, who were engaged with the Legion in the fight, and placing them at the head of the column, compelled them to lead the advance, threatening to shoot them on the spot if the column was fired upon. Our prisoners were robbed of their money, hats, boots, and clothing. Five hundred horses were gathered up and taken from the citizens of Harrison county. Among the plundering crowd was recognized a spy, who had recently been, for a short time, a resident of Corydon, and was well acquainted with the place and people. Having secured as much plunder and as many fresh horses as possible, and given his command a few hours rest, late on the afternoon of the 9th, Morgan marched out of Corydon, leaving behind to the care of the citizens eleven of his wounded, two of whom soon afterwards died. A few miles out of the town, Mr. Speer H. Hurst was wounded while endeavoring to avoid capture, and two boys were shot at and wounded, in the north part of the county

Throwing out detachments on his flanks, Morgan advanced with the main body northward to Palmyra, where he halted two hours to recuperate and rob ; the detachment on the right taking Greenville, in Floyd county, and that on the left entering Paoli, in Orange county. These movements were well calculated to distract the attention of our authorities, and confuse their arrangements to protect important points, as they left it uncertain where he intended to strike. From Paoli, he threatened the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad at Mitchell. From Palmyra, he could strike the New Albany and Salem Railroad at Salem, and from Greenville, he had within easy reach both the New Albany Railroad at New Providence, and the Jeffersonville Railroad at Vienna. Morgan, however, either deemed it unsafe to scatter his forces in so many directions, or accomplished all he aimed at in simply thus showing himself, for the detachments, after taking all the horses and plundering all the farm houses within reach in Harrison, Crawford, Orange, Floyd and Washington counties, through portions of each of which they passed, converged towards Salem, in Washington county, where the entire force arrived at nine o'clock on the orning of the 10th. They easily dispersed the squads of badly armed Minute-men that came out to meet them, entered the town without difficulty, and captured a company of the Washington county Legion, commanded by Captain John Davis, which unknowingly came in just after they had entered, for the purpose of receiving their arms and ammunition to resist the raid. A small force under Hon. James A. Cravens, was forced hastily to retreat, and another company, which was on its way to the town upon a train of the New Albany and Salem Railroad, narrowly escaped capture. But for the prudent caution of the engineer, who suspected danger from the number of mounted men he saw near the track, the last mentioned company would have been caught inevitably, and the whole train lost. At Salem, Morgan burned the large railroad bridge, destroyed several small bridges and culverts, tore up the track for a considerable distance, and burned the depot, with its contents. He also levied $1,000.00 upon each of the mills of the vicinity, and plundered all the stores and most of the dwellings. In fact, such a scene of pillage was enacted as was certainly never before witnessed in this State, and probably nowhere else. General Duke's description of it is too graphic to be omitted.

 He says : "This disposition to wholesale plunder exceeded anything that any of us had ever seen before-The great cause for apprehension which our situation might have inspired seemed only to make the men reckless. Calico was the staple article of appropriation. Each man who could get one, tied a bolt of it to his saddle, only to throw it away and get a fresh one at the first opportunity. They did not pillage with any sort of method or reason. It seemed to be a mania, senseless and purposeless. One man carried a bird-cage, with three canaries in it, two days. Another rode with a chafing-dish, which looked like a small metallic coffin, on the pommel of his saddle, until an officer forced him to throw it away. Although the weather was intensely warm, another, still, slung seven pairs of skates around his neck, and chuckled over his acquisition ! They pillaged like boys robbing an orchard. I would not have believed that such a passion could have been developed so ludicrously among any body of civilized men."

 The rebels did not stay long in Salem. Detachments were sent out towards Brownstown, Jackson county, on the direct road to Indianapolis, which was picketed and scouted by two companies of mounted Minute-men, under Captain Meedy W. Shields, and towards Orleans. Morgan soon discovered that his road northward was too hazardous to attempt, and hearing that General Hobson with a large cavalry force was following hard upon his track, and that the forces of the State were rapidly gathering to intercept him and protect the most important points, he left Salem about two o'clock P. M., and hurried towards the Ohio with the apparent single object of putting that stream between himself and the hornets' nest he had roused, as speedily as possible.

 The Flight And Pursuit
General Hobson with about 4,000 mounted men and some pieces of artillery, of General Judah's command, had been following Morgan through Kentucky for several days. On the morning of the 9th he arrived at Brandenburg, about the time that the rebel advance was skirmishing with our forces on the road to Corydon. A portion of their rear guard was still in sight on this side of the river, and the "Alice Dean," which had been set on fire after serving their purpose, was still burning near the Indiana bank. A number of steamers, in response to General Hobson's application for means of ferriage, arrived from Louisville about noon, and the command commenced crossing. The advance, instead of pressing on, encamped on a convenient hill, and awaited the passage of the main body. They and their horses, however, needed rest; and the advance, alone, was too weak to have rendered any very effective assistance to our force at Corydon. By three o'clock on the morning of the 10th, the entire command had crossed, and the pursuit was resumed. At ten o'clock it reached Corydon, when it was twenty-five miles behind Morgan, who was then at Salem. After a brief halt, it pushed on and at night encamped within a few miles of Salem.

 In the meanwhile Morgan, by a rapid march to the east, passed through the villages of Canton and New Philadelphia, and reached Vienna, on the Jeffersonville railroad, at six o'clock in the evening. He made no halt there, but pressed on, though his troops were so much wearied they consumed nearly the whole night in passing. The citizens were not molested. At a little grocery near the depot they obtained some provisions and paid for them in "greenbacks". The depot and bridge were burned by a small detachment, while the main body continued its march ; but the bridge was repaired a few hours afterward. At this place, General Duke says, Morgan "tapped the telegraph," having captured the operator before he could give the alarm, and learned " that orders had been given to the militia to fell timber and blockade all the roads we [the rebels] would be likely to travel—our rapid marching having, hitherto, saved us this annoyance."  That night he reached Lexington, the county seat of Scott county, eight miles east of Vienna, and encamped. He, with a small escort, slept in the town. During the night a small party of Colonel Sering's troops, from Madison, who were out scouting, entered the place, made a few observations and dashed away without molestation. A movement was commenced to intercept Morgan at Vienna, on the afternoon of the 10th, by sending a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery from Jeffersonville by rail, under Brigadier General M. D. Manson, and the troops were already embarked on the cars in high spirits, when an order from General Boyle, to whose command the post at Jeffersonville belonged, stopped them.

 It is probable that the revelation, made by the appearance of our scouts at Lexington, of the preparations in progress to prevent his reaching the Ohio in the direction of Madison, induced Morgan to again change his course. From Corydon he had moved northward to Salem, with the probable design of attacking or threatening Indianapolis, but he soon discovered that that route was impracticable, and so changed his course eastward, doubtless in the hope of finding an outlet at some not very distant point across the river, which had now became a serious obstacle and vexation to him. Baffled on almost every hand, he moved out of Lexington on the morning of the llth, in a northerly direction towards Vernon, throwing out a detachment to make a feint against Madison, and thereby to prevent our troops there from moving up the Madison and Indianapolis railroad to give him trouble on that line. At Vernon there were two large bridges on the Madison railroad, which he might destroy; and at North Vernon, four miles further north, the Madison railroad crossed the Ohio and Mississippi railroad, and presented a most inviting field for destruction, and the surest means of preventing pursuit by our troops South and West. But our authorities were as well aware of the importance of these lines of road as he was, and as soon as it was known that he had turned eastward from Salem, General Willcox took measures to protect his communications by ordering a part of General Love's force, then at Seymour, to Vernon. Colonel Williams' and Colonel Burkhams' regiments of the Legion, were accordingly sent forward, with four pieces of artillery, by the Ohio and Mississippi railroad, and they were instructed to hold the place at all hazards. General Love was also ordered to move to the same point as soon as practicable with the remainder of his force. Leaving Colonel Burkham at North Vernon, Colonel Williams took his own regiment and one company of Colonel Burkham's, with two pieces of artillery, to Vernon, and posted them so as to defend the bridges and the town. With some armed citizens of Jennings county, his whole force was about 400 men.

 Morgan came in sight of Vernon in the afternoon. "A strong force was posted there," General Duke states, "which Morgan did not care to attack," but desiring to get past without betraying his purpose, he sent in a flag of truce and demanded a surrender. At the same he threw out skirmishers along the roads and apparently prepared for an attack, and, under cover of these demonstrations, moved off his main column towards Dupont. Colonel Williams met the summons to surrender with the reply that he " was abundantly able to hold the place, and if General Morgan got it, he must take it by "hard fighting." It is possible that, notwithstanding the movement of his main column towards Dupont and the feint by which he attempted to cover it, Morgan expected a surrender, for in a short time he sent a second flag with a similar summons, and he must have felt a little unwilling to give it up, without any effort to secure them, the important objects for which he had come so much further north than he needed to if he only wanted, as Colonel Duke intimates, to cross the Madison railroad and keep on his way.

 If that had been his only purpose he could have gone directly to Dupont and thus have saved some ten or twelve miles. Colonel Williams refused to receive the second message, but detained the bearer of the flag until the arrival of General Love, which occurred soon after. The General at once sent back, as his answer, a summons to Morgan himself to surrender. By this time our force had been increased to 1,000 men; and small and ill prepared as it was, General Love at once began his preparations for a fight. He sent a flag of truce to Morgan asking two hours to remove the women and children, and the reply came granting thirty minutes. The non-combatants were at once removed to a wood near by where they would be protected, the guns were placed in position, and the troops disposed so as to make the best defense possible. But no farther demonstration was made, except a movement as if the rebels aimed to get in between Vernon and North Vernon, which brought on a slight skirmish and ended " the siege."

 It is evident, notwithstanding General Duke's indifferent allusion to it, that the check at Vernon was something more than an impediment in a convenient road. Morgan was defeated in an important object; and the fast thickening dangers caused him to abandon his plans almost as soon as he had undertaken to put them into execution. While these operations were in progress, Major General Wallace was started with a brigade of troops just collected and organized at Indianapolis, and Major General Hughes was ordered with his command from Mitchell, and both proceeded by rail to Vernon with such promptitude that they would have attacked Morgan early the next morning, had he not in the meantime prudently resumed his flight. General Love, having learned from Mr. Thomas Reiley, Recorder of Jennings county, who had been taken prisoner, that the rebels were at Dupont about one o'clock in the night, sent all his mounted force, consisting of twenty men, under Captain Boyd, to reconnoiter. They picked up some twenty or thirty stragglers, with whom they returned in the morning, and confirmed the news as to Morgan's position. He had halted and camped about midnight near Dupont, on the Madison railroad, some eight miles southeast of Vernon. Detachments, sent out for the purpose, destroyed a portion of the track of the railroad, and burned two large and costly bridges, one on Big creek, a mile south of town, and the other over Graham's Fork. A water tank, twelve freight cars and a warehouse were burned; the telegraph wires were cut; F. F. Mayfield's pork house was plundered of 2,000 hams, and his store of $1,700 worth of goods. General Duke says of this operation, that "it was a new feature in the practice of appropriation; every man had a ham slung to his saddle. The other stores in the town were robbed of small amounts; horses were taken in all directions, barns plundered and wheat fields destroyed.

 At four o'clock on the morning of Sunday, the 12th of July, the rebel advance moved out of Dupont, taking the road to Versailles, in Ripley county. Here was another change of direction to the northward. The object of it was probably to strike the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad at a point eastward from North Vernon, and accomplish there what was so signally defeated at Vernon. One regiment, sent in advance to destroy bridges and capture horses, dashed into Versailles about half past one o'clock, captured Colonel James H. Cravens, with 300 militia and minute-men, and the Treasurer of Ripley county, with $5,000 of public funds. The stores and dwellings were pillaged of course. There was now force enough on Morgan's track, and ready to be concentrated in his front, to have crushed him in almost a moment if they could have been placed where they were needed. But there were serious obstacles in the way. First, there was the inherent difficulty of pursuing or encountering cavalry with infantry transported by railway. Infantry, it is true, can travel faster in such a case, but must travel on fixed lines, and if cavalry are not accommodating enough to travel on the same lines, the infantry must seek other means of moving. We needed cavalry to supplement the service of our railways, and without it Morgan could not be "cornered," attacked or held at bay so as to give the infantry time to reach him. Besides he did not want or intend to fight—only to "throw dust" in the eyes of those who were trying to catch him. General Hobson's force was following as rapidly as possible, certainly, but it labored under the serious disadvantage of pursuing, with jaded and almost broken-down horses, a column which was constantly recruiting itself with fresh ones, and, of course, stripping the country, and leaving scarcely any for the pursuers.But another difficulty added greatly to the embarrassment of our authorities—the want of correct and consistent information. It was impossible for any merely human intelligence to divine the truth in the flood of conflicting and befogging reports that poured into the Capital. Morgan marched constantly, with strong detachments thrown well out on his flanks, and thus secured the double advantage of covering a greater extent of horse producing territory to recruit from, and of bewildering the people along the line as to where he was really going, and to this, no doubt, much of the unreliable and confusing information may be attributed. A few specimens of these reports are here given to show more clearly by what uncertain light our authorities were compelled to act.

 On July 10^th, the day that Morgan was at Salem, there came reports to the Governor that our forces had retreated through Fredericksburg, Orange county, at daylight, pursued by Morgan's whole command, 6,000 strong; that 3,000 rebels had taken Paoli, and were advancing upon the Ohio & Mississippi Railroad at Mitchell; that 3,000 rebels had encamped the night before, (the 9th, while Morgan was on the march to Salem,) at Palmyra, and were moving towards Vienna; that the rebels were north of Salem—and that Salem had been captured and burned. These were confusing enough, but those on the next day were worse. On the ll^th, in the morning, the news came that Morgan was at Vienna, and thought to be trying to get to the Ohio river, to cross, at Madison Flats; at two o'clock it was reported that our gunboats were engaging the rebels near Madison : and at half-past five, that Morgan was at Vernon, demanding its surrender. On the 12^th it was reported that Morgan was at Versailles at half-past one in the afternoon; at three, that he had suddenly turned, and, with his whole force, was marching on Indianapolis; shortly after, that he was skirmishing at Sunman's Station, on the Indianapolis and Cincinnati Railroad ; at eleven o'clock at night, that he was marching on Aurora and Lawrenceburg, and endeavoring to cross the Ohio at one of those places. A dispatch from Mitchell thickened the confusion by reporting that General Buckner had crossed the Ohio at Brandenburg with 10,000 men, had burned Palmyra, and was advancing toward Indianapolis. On the 13^th, the day that Morgan crossed into Ohio, it was reported, first, that he was fighting at Mitchell; then, that he was fighting at Sunman's; again, that he had captured Dillsboro, Dearborn county, and was threatening Lawrenceburg; then, that he had escaped into Ohio at Harrison ; and directly afterwards, that he had turned back, and was marching upon Lawrenceburg!

 A third difficulty was one in some degree inseparable from the use of raw troops suddenly called into service. When ordered to move, they were not ready promptly, or their supplies of subsistence or ammunition were not brought up, and the railway trains were behind time. Delays of many hours occurred, which could have been avoided if the managers had acted with sufficient energy, or if officers had not been so much confused by conflicting reports and orders. With these embarrassments surrounding them and clogging every movement, the authorities began, as soon as it was known that Morgan had reached Versailles, to prepare to protect the line of the Indianapolis and Cincinnati Railroad, and by concentrating troops upon it, intercept him if possible. General Hughes, with the troops from Mitchell, started for Osgood, on the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, as soon as it was known that Morgan was moving northward from Dupont. General Wallace, with his own troops and Love's brigade, also moved up from Vernon, having previously pursued the enemy to Dupont, and then having to return to North Vernon to get transportation on the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad.

 Neither of these forces, however, arrived at Osgood until the rebels had passed. In the meantime, while at Vernon, General Wallace ordered the collection, by impressment, of all the horses in the neighborhood, to form a cavalry force for pursuit, and entrusted its execution and command to Colonel Lawrence S. Shuler, of the One Hundred and Third Regiment Minute-men, who worked so vigorously that by four o'clock of the afternoon of the ll^th he had mounted one hundred and forty-six men, and started rapidly on the track of the rebels. General Wallace also, while yet at Vernon, anticipating (as did most of our citizens) that Morgan would endeavor to escape at or near Lawrenceburg, requested the people of that vicinity, by telegraph, to collect, wagons and meet him at a designated point near Osgood. Morgan was then but twenty-five miles ahead, and General Wallace was quite confident that a prompt compliance with his request would have enabled him to have made a forced march, and compelled a collision with the enemy. The transportation asked for, however, was not furnished, and the command moved on as rapidly as possible, reaching Sunman's Station on the 14^th, General Hughes being there also. The combined force was about fifty-five hundred strong—amply sufficient to have defeated the rebels, General Wallace says "in an open field fight"; but the delays of transportation, and the distance to be marched, prevented them from arriving in time.

 Morgan left Versailles at four o'clock on the afternoon of Sunday, the 12^th. He destroyed two bridges, tore up the railroad track and captured the telegraph operator at Osgood, and, following along the line of the Ohio and Mississippi railroad through Pierceville to Milan, destroyed all the bridges as he went. The main body, according to General Duke, after marching far into the night, reached Sunman's Station, and halted to rest. Here were some 2,500 militia, Colonel James Gavin's One Hundred and Fourth Regiment of minute-men being among them. His pickets were encountered by the rebel advance about two miles from the railroad, and a slight skirmish ensued. The rebels turned off, not daring to attack our infantry, and not giving them an opportunity to bring on an action. At five o'clock the next morning, the 13^th, Morgan moved eastwardly from his bivouac a few miles from Sunman's, in the direction of the Ohio line, crossing the railroad at three stations—Harmon's, Van Weddon's, and Weisburg. The bridges and track at all these places were destroyed, and a water tank at Van Weddon's burned. Passing rapidly on by Hubbell's corner, New Alsace, Dover and Logan, the rebel advance reached Harrison, Ohio, a little after twelve o'clock noon.

 At Sunman's Station, Colonel Kline G. Shryock, One Hundred and Fifth Regiment of minute-men, finding that Morgan had crossed the railroad and disabled it, commenced the march with his regiment on foot to Lawrenceburg, the point to which he was originally destined. About a mile out he met Colonel Shuler's cavalry command, which had joined General Hobson's force on the evening of the ll^th; and which was now in the advance. Shuler had followed so strenuously, by five o'clock in the afternoon of the 12^th he had come up with the rebel rear guard, and had been pressing close after them ever since. Learning that they were but four or five miles ahead, Colonel Shryock determined to follow Colonel Shuler, so as to support him in case of an encounter. Colonel Shuler came in sight of the rear of the main rebel column at Harrison, Ohio, in the afternoon of the 13th, and, expecting to be able to make an attack, he ordered up Colonel Shryock's regiment, which came rapidly forward. The bridge over Whitewater, at Harrison, had been burned, but, after exchanging a few shots across the river, a convenient ford for our cavalry was found, and it entered the town, only to find it pillaged and the enemy flying, as usual. Here Colonel Shuler rested for a few hours, and then continued the pursuit, going as far as Batavia, Ohio, where, as he says, finding the citizens able and ready to protect themselves, he halted and returned home. He speaks in his report very warmly of the enthusiastic welcome given to his command by the people of Ohio. Colonel Shryock marched to Lawrenceburg, whether Colonel Gavin's regiment had preceded him. There can be that little doubt but Morgan's original intention was to "go through" Indiana and Ohio, and his historian intimates that all his attempts and maneuvers to cross the river while in this State, were mere feints. From the dangers that fast gathered on on his track after he left Vernon, it can hardly be doubted, had an opportunity offered, he would gladly have escaped across the river long before he crossed the Ohio line. His men were literally worn out for want of sleep and rest. The evening after he left Harrison, it was with the greatest difficulty his first brigade was prevented from going to pieces. "Strong men fell out of their saddles, and at every halt the officers were compelled to move continually about their respective commands and pull and haul the men who would drop asleep in the road—it was the only way to keep them awake." After leaving Sunman's Station, on the morning of the 13^th, in a period of thirty-five hours, he marched more than ninety miles, the greatest march, Duke says, he ever made. During his brief pilgrimage of five days through the State, he certainly did not feel that he was "master of the situation," by a very great deal.

 As soon as Governor Morton was informed of the escape of Morgan into Ohio, he notified Governor TOD of that State, of the fact, and tendered him the services of 5,000 of our State troops; and steps were at once taken to forward as large a force as possible, in pursuance of this proffer. Our authorities hoped that if a vigorous and prompt movement was made, Morgan might be intercepted at or near Hamilton, Ohio. A brigade of three regiments of Minute-men, the One Hundred and Eighth, Colonel William C. Wilson; the One Hundred and Sixth, Colonel Isaac P. Gray, and the One Hundred and Ninth, Colonel .John R. Mahan, with the Twelfth Michigan Battery of Light Artillery, was ordered to rendezvous at the Indiana Central Railway in Indianapolis, the first two regiments at 3 o'clock P. M., the third at 5 o'clock P. M. of the 13^th of July, to take the cars for Hamilton. The regiments reported promptly. The Michigan Battery, while hastening to the rendezvous about dusk, in obedience to the order, met with a fearful accident. The caisson of one of the guns exploded in the middle of the street in the northwestern part of the city, hurling two of the men who were riding upon it many yards through the air, mutilating them frightfully, and of course killing them instantly, and wounding another, and a lad who was passing by at the moment, so badly that they both died a few hours afterward. The remainder of the battery joined the brigade at the railway. Here a most unfortunate and inexcusable detention occurred. The regiments were compelled to wait from five to seven hours before they could get away, delaying their arrival at Hamilton until daybreak, and as late as 10 o'clock on the morning of the 14^th. The brigade was at first placed under command of Brigadier General Carrington, with orders to use all dispatch and move with as many troops as could then be transported at 3 o'clock. Learning, at 9 o'clock at night, that he had not started, and that there was no sufficient excuse for his delay, General Willcox removed him from the command and gave it to General Hascall, who at once hastened the movement of the two regiments yet remaining, and reached Hamilton, as he states, "just in time to be too late." The detention was quite mortifying to every one concerned in the expedition, and the opinion prevailed that if the original orders had been carried out, Morgan would have been overtaken. In the afternoon of the 14^th, General Hascall ordered the whole brigade to Cincinnati; whence, in a day or two, all returned to Indianapolis and were discharged.

 The resistance and pursuit of the rebels was as nearly bloodless as any hostile movement on so large a scale could be, but it was destined to cause more bloodshed after its departure than it did by its presence. On the evening of the 13^th, Colonel Gavin, in command at Lawrenceburg, having been informed that Morgan had taken Harrison and had turned back and was advancing upon Lawrenceburg, took prompt measures to meet him. He sent out his own regiment, the One Hundred and Fourth, half a mile beyond Hardinton on the turnpike where a strong barricade was constructed, and a line of battle was formed along the tow path of the canal so as to use the canal bank as a defense. Colonel Shryock's regiment, the One Hundred and Fifth, was ordered to take position, half a mile in the rear. About nine o'clock at night, while marching to the assigned position through a very short curve in the road at Hardinton, the rear of the column seeing the head indistinctly in the darkness, and unaware of the curve which threw the men in front on a line parallel with those in the rear, mistook it for a portion of the expected enemy's force, and a shot accidentally fired at the moment made the impression so strong that they fired into the advance. The advance, of course, mistook the fire for that of the enemy and returned it Colonel Shryock instantly rode down the line to stop the firing, telling the men that they were killing their comrades, but though promptly obeyed he was too late to prevent a serious catastrophe. Five men were killed, one mortally and eighteen more or less severely wounded. The following is a list of the casualties caused by this sad mistake :

Killed.—Sergeant John Gordon, privates Oliver P. Jones, William Faulkner, Ferdinand Hefner and John Porter. Wounded.—Captains A. K. Branaham and William Nicholson ; Lieutenants William E. Hart (mortally,) Samuel Bewsey and Joel Newman ; Sergeants Richard M. Baker, John Pyle and James E. Bates; Privates Samuel E. Duncan, Edmund Bloomfield, Martin Hoover, William Flint, David S. Gooding, W. G. Johnson, D. W. Parrish, R. T. Raines, Jabez Wilson, Allen R. Bates and (Unknown) Hart.

 The regiments at all points were discharged and sent home as soon as possible, and measures were taken whereby they were paid for their services by the State in due time at the same rates allowed the soldiers of the United States. On the 15th Governor Morton issued an address " To the officers and soldiers of the Legion and Minute-men of Indiana,"* in which, after reciting Ihe occurrences of the preceding week—the invasion by the rebels, the prompt gathering of sixty-five thousand men to resist them, and the movement to the field within three days of thirty thousand men fully armed and organized—he spoke with just pride of so wonderful an exhibition of the spirit of the people, and of its effect in turning the raid into a desperate flight, and tendered to the troops on behalf of the State his hearty thanks for their alacrity and self-sacrifice in responding to his call. He took occasion also to urge the import ance of a thorough organization of the Legion, and his anxiety to see the temporary organizations of the Minute-men converted into permanent ones under the law.

 Though not within the prescribed limits of this Report, it may still not be out of place to follow as briefly as possible Morgan's daring movement to its catastrophe. After leaving Harrison he maneuvered to confuse General Burnside at Cincinnati as to the point at which he would cross the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad, thinking that once past that line no concentration of troops strong enough to take him could be made in his front. Detachments were sent out in direction of Hamilton, to create the impression that he would advance upon that place, while the main body started directly toward Cincinnati, hoping thus to send the forces that might get in his way, part up to Hamilton and part back to Cincinnati. At this time he had less than 2,000 effective men. His plans for eluding our forces and getting past Cincinnati succeeded, but on the 19^th he was 
overtaken near Buffington Island, in the Ohio river, where he was, much against his will, forced into a sharp fight, and which ended in the capture of 700 of his men. A portion of his Ninth Tennessee regiment managed to cross the river in a small flat boat before the fight began, and escaped. With near 1,200 men, he resumed his flight up the river, pursued by Hobson. About twenty miles above Buffington Island 300 more made their escape by crossing the river, and with them some of the best officers of the command.

The weakened and worn-down force was here re-organized, each of the two brigades having only about 400 men. During the night, near Blennerhassett's Island, where he had previously tried to cross, he was almost surrounded, but escaped by leading his men in single file along the side of a steep hill to another road. He escaped capture again at the Muskingum river by passing along a path upon which it was barely possible for a horse to travel, guided, it is presumed, by some of the sympathizing citizens of the vicinity. But he was still pressed upon all sides, more and more closely. His troops were killed or captured in squads at every point. On the 26^th, near Salineville, Columbiana county, Ohio, within nine miles of the western boundary of Pennsylvania, his force being reduced to 250 men, and seeing himself hemmed in upon all sides, he surrendered to a militia Captain, dictating almost as he pleased his own terms. This ingenious arrangement, however, was unceremoniously set aside by General Shackleford, of General Hobson's command, who soon came up and took charge of Morgan and his remnant of men as prisoners of war. Thus ended the Morgan raid. Only four organized companies escaped. Besides these some 300 stragglers got safely away, but as General Duke mournfully states, "The raid destroyed Morgan's division, and left but a remnant of the Morgan cavalry."